Contagion and REIT Stock Prices by Chinmoy Ghosh et al.
389






Abstract. This article investigates the contagious movement of real estate investment trust
(REIT) stock prices in response to real estate news related to ﬁnancial institutions’ real
estate portfolios. The basic hypothesis is that because real estate assets are traded
infrequently, the market has incomplete information about their true value; thus, REIT
stock prices react negatively to announcements of poorly performing real estate portfolios
of ﬁnancial institutions. Consistent with the hypothesis, signiﬁcantly negative reactions to
these announcements are found for a portfolio of sixty-nine REITs during the real estate
crisis of 1989–91.
Introduction
Evidence on contagion, where the market uses the information about one ﬁrm’s poor
ﬁnancial performance to infer that similar problems exist with other ﬁrms, is just
becoming available in the real estate literature. A recent paper by Ghosh, Guttery and
Sirmans (1997) shows that announcements by only one bank (insurance company)
adversely affected the stock prices of other banks (insurers) and devalued S&L and
insurance (bank) stocks, even though there were no discernible events of similar
importance affecting the thrift or insurance (banking) industries, or any particular ﬁrm
within these industries. The exposure of banks, S&Ls and insurance companies to
poorly performing real estate assets constitutes a close link between the performance
of these ﬁrms’ publicly traded stocks.1
This article, an extension of Ghosh, Guttery and Sirmans (1997), examines the impact
of declining real estate values on the stock prices of real estate investment trusts
(REITs) over the period 1989 through 1991. Because the majority of REIT assets are
in the form of real estate equities or mortgages that are collatoralized by real estate,
contagion likely is prevalent across these publicly traded trusts, as well. The
investigation of the valuation impact of an announcement constitutes the ﬁrst attempt
to measure inter-industry contagion on REITs. In essence, the exposure of banks and
insurance companies to real estate assets during the sample period provides an
excellent opportunity to investigate contagion effects across industries, rather than
within the same industry.
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The results suggest signiﬁcant stock price responses by REITs to announcements
about other poorly performing real estate portfolios. Contagion predicts that an
announcement by a single ﬁrm about the value of its real estate holdings elicits a
price response from other ﬁrms in the same industry and in different industries with
similar portfolios. Because of non-trading or infrequent trading and the consequent
uncertainty as to the market value of real estate assets, investors pay particular
attention to corporate and economic events that reveal information about the value of
these assets. In this analysis, dates are identiﬁed when major announcements in the
national press revealed information about lenders’ declining real estate values, and an
examination is made of the consequent impact on REIT stock values. This allows an
examination of whether or not contagion is prevalent.
The Real Estate Downturn of 1989–91
Capozza (1994) labels the 1989–91 ﬁnancial downturn as ‘‘... one of the worst
banking crises of recent decades, (suggesting that) real estate played a central role in
this credit cycle as overbuilding and regional recessions wreaked havoc with the asset
base of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.’’2 The real estate crisis began with
increased investment by banks, thrifts and insurance companies in real estate
properties and mortgages during the early and mid-1980s when real estate values
increased. Declining interest rates, an abundant supply of ﬁnancing for construction,
pent-up demand for residential dwellings, industrial plant expansions, increased
demand for commercial and ofﬁce space and favorable tax legislation enacted as early
as 1981 all contributed to a building boom throughout most of the 1980s. However,
this expansion resulted in greater vacancies, declining rental income and many
distressed properties nationwide. Increased uncertainty about future cash ﬂows,
coupled with declining income, led to reduced market values. Therefore, borrowers
and lenders became increasingly involved in workouts, renegotiations and
foreclosures.
When real estate values declined, lenders realized losses in the form of write-offs and
charges during the late 1980s and early 1990s. They lowered costs through dividend
cuts, wage freezes and reductions, branch ofﬁce closings and employee layoffs. By
1990, two-thirds of commercial banks’ maturing construction loans were not paid off
according to the original terms, and more than half of their non-performing loans
were either soured real estate loans or delinquent commercial and consumer loans
secured by real estate. Similarly, life insurance companies were forced to extend
billions of dollars in new loans to real estate developers because declining real estate
values often circumvented reﬁnances or rollovers.
Growing concern by regulators and investors about lenders’ questionable investment
choices led to regulators’ requests for more disclosure. New capital requirements, as
set forth by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), signiﬁcantly reduced the supply of capital provided by commercial banks,
thrifts and insurance companies.CONTAGION AND REIT STOCK PRICES 391
Event Dates
Dates are identiﬁed when major news articles involving real estate asset valuation
appear in The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and/or The New York Times (NYT). Over the
period 1989 through 1991, the WSJ and NYT published numerous articles on the
declining value of residential and commercial real estate assets. From these, articles
that conveyed new information about the real estate problems facing banking, thrift
and insurance ﬁrms were identiﬁed. Speciﬁcally, stock price reactions for equally-
weighted portfolios of REITs are examined surrounding eight dates. Brief descriptions
of articles around these dates are presented in Exhibit 1.
The investigation of news events over the three years indicates that during 1989 and
1990, the media focused primarily on banks’ problems. Insurance companies received
increasing attention during 1990 and 1991. The choice of the eight dates was dictated
by the following agenda: (1) include announcements about a major ﬁrm’s real estate
problems in the banking or insurance sectors; events on September 24 and October
8, 1990 and November 18, 1991 fall in this category;3 and (2) include announcements
that analyze the overall impact of the real estate crisis on banking or insurance ﬁrms’
current or future performance; the stories on October 16 and December 18, 1989,
August 1 and August 21, 1990 and July 24, 1991 satisfy this requirement.
Announcements where industry or regulatory experts detail the real estate crisis are
included, also. None of these dates’ announcements mention the effects of the crisis
on REIT stocks.
The stories on October 16, 1989, August 1, 1990 and September 24, 1990 can be
categorized as banking related. News coverage on August 21, 1990, October 8, 1990,
July 24, 1991 and November 18, 1991 focused on insurance companies. Although the
December 18, 1989 announcements involved both banking and insurance ﬁrms, they
emphasized insurers’ real estate problems. In essence, these eight dates include an
even representation of bank and insurance ﬁrms, as well as stories with both ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and industry-wide ramiﬁcations. The inclusion of stories with differing
backgrounds allows an investigation of inter-industry contagion effects, and a
determination as to whether the magnitude of the price reaction reﬂects the qualitative
characteristics of the announcements. In the next section, hypotheses are developed
about inter-industry information transfer regarding non-performing real estate loans
and the consequent stock price movements of REITs.
Hypotheses
This study adopts Lang and Stulz’s (1992) benign form of contagion to argue that an
announcement that reveals negative information about the real estate components of
cash ﬂows common to all ﬁrms in the industry decreases the market’s expectations
of the proﬁtability of the industry’s ﬁrms. Because the entire ﬁnancial sector was
affected by the real estate crisis, the contagion hypothesis can be extended to argue
that announcements pertaining to the value of real estate assets of a ﬁrm in a speciﬁc
industry may reveal information about ﬁrms in other industries with similar real estate
exposures. This is referred to as inter-industry contagion.392 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 1
Dates and Summary of Major News Events Concerning
Real Estate Portfolios
Date Summary of Event
October 16, 1989 Third-quarter earnings of major banks in the Northeast and South trail
expectations, due primarily to additions to loan-loss reserves because of
depressed real estate markets.
December 18, 1989 Insurance companies will be hurt seriously by real estate losses because
of their large exposure to commercial property. This is the ﬁrst
announcement of insurers’ real estate problems. Risky real estate lending
is a major source of problems for banks, namely those in the Northeast.
August 1, 1990 The Chairman of the FDIC reports that ever-weakening real estate markets,
combined with a near record number of bank failures, are likely to produce
the third consecutive annual loss for the fund that insures deposits at
commercial banks. He attributes the drain to the commercial real estate
market’s effect on the banking system, and reiterates many banks’ weak
earnings are directly related to real estate values.
August 21, 1990 Anticipated increases in foreclosures likely will force many insurers to take
write-offs, reduce dividend payments, and increase loan-loss reserves
because of non-recourse commercial real estate loans.
September 24, 1990 Chase Manhattan sharply cuts its dividend and sets aside in the current
quarter more than $650 million as additional reserves against potential
losses on domestic loans, mostly in real estate. Its decision seems to
presage additional bad news for the nation’s banking sector, and loan-loss
reserves by other banks are considered probable. Several large New York
banks concede further deterioration in Northeast real estate values.
Moody’s downgrades Chase’s debt.
October 8, 1990 Travelers announces a $500 million third-quarter loss during trading hours
on October 5 and reduces its dividend by 33 percent, due largely to a $650
million addition to reserves for possible losses on mortgage and real
estate investments. Analysts expect its actions to presage similar moves
by other companies with substantial mortgage holdings, and might lead
them to reconsider their dividend policy. Both S&P and Moody’s
downgrade Travelers’ debt. Most analysts believe the company will have
to cut payout again if the real estate market does not recover.
July 24, 1991 Moody’s cuts several insurers’ ratings because of their real estate
exposure. Investors are warned not to acquire insurance company stocks.
Mutual Beneﬁt Life’s failure is blamed on its poor real estate portfolio’s
performance.
November 18, 1991 Mutual of New York, reported to have ‘‘been troubled by heavy real estate
exposure,’’ had withdrawals of over $900 million during the third quarter
of 1991; this was $500 million more than anticipated. The ‘‘run’’ is blamed
by policy and contract holders on its large real estate exposure. Travelers
is reported to face an SEC inquiry of its disclosure and accounting
practices on its $15.3 billion real estate portfolio.CONTAGION AND REIT STOCK PRICES 393
Under the inter-industry contagion hypothesis, ﬁrms across industries with similar
portfolios react negatively when an announcement reveals adverse information about
the portfolio of a particular ﬁrm or industry. If contagion exists, REITs would react
adversely to announcements about real estate problems of banks, insurers and thrifts.
Data and Empirical Model
The analysis is based on a sample of sixty-nine REITs (see the Appendix for a list
of the sample trusts), of which forty-two are equity type REITs, fourteen are mortgage
REITs and thirteen are hybrids. To be included in the sample, each REIT’s daily
returns data must be available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
tape for the entire sample period.
Excess returns are estimated for individual ﬁrms and for equally-weighted portfolios
of REITs over three-day and ﬁve-day announcement windows, as well as for days
21, 0 and 11, where day 0 represents the announcement day. The cumulative
windows are used because the news release is often spread around the announcement
day. A multivariate regression model similar to those in Cornett and Tehranian (1990)
and Fenn and Cole (1994) is estimated using daily returns data over consecutive
trading days starting one hundred days prior to October 16, 1989 and ending twenty
days after November 18, 1991. The model measures excess returns by the coefﬁcients
of event window dummy variables that are included in a system of market model
equations.
For a portfolio of REITs, the following regression is estimated:
R 5 b 1 bR 1 bR 1 bD 1 bD 1 ... 1 bD1 e, (1) t 01 S&P500,t 2 T-Bill,t 31 42 1 08
where:
Rt 5 Return on the REIT portfolio on day t, t 5 1, 2, ..., 712;
RS&P500,t 5 Return on the S&P 500 on day t;
RT-Bill,t 5 Return on the three-month T-bill on day t;
D1, D2, ... , D8 5 Event-window dummies for the eight announcement dates; and,
e 5 Error term.
With this speciﬁcation, the estimated parameters, b3, ..., b10, measure average excess
returns during the eight event windows, respectively.4 The event windows are day 21
to day 11 and day 22t od a y12 in relation to the announcement dates. To measure
the daily average excess returns, the same model is re-estimated with twenty-four
dummies (i.e., three dummies for each announcement period). The dummy variables
have a value of one during the event period, and zero otherwise.
For each announcement, the procedure involves two tests. First, the daily and
cumulative excess returns for portfolios of REITs are estimated and compared to
examine inter-industry contagion effects. If the excess returns for REITs are
signiﬁcantly negative, the evidence is consistent with the inter-industry contagion394 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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hypothesis.5 Second, excess returns of individual companies are regressed on an event
window dummy variable representing a mortgage (hybrid) REIT. A signiﬁcantly
negative relation between excess returns and the mortgage (hybrid) type of REIT
supports the notion that equity REITs were less adversely affected by the news than
mortgage (hybrid) REITs. These excess returns are also regressed on a variable
measuring the asset size of each REIT. A signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient suggests
better capitalized REITs were less adversely affected by the real estate crisis than
those with less total market capitalization.
Results
Event Study Analysis
The results of the event study analysis are presented in Exhibit 2, including the three-
day and ﬁve-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), and the daily abnormal returns
of REITs around the eight announcement dates. Corresponding t-Statistics are in
parentheses. Twenty-three of the twenty-four three-day CAR, ﬁve-day CAR and Day
0 daily returns coefﬁcients are negative. Moreover, seven of the eight event dates’
three-day or ﬁve-day CARs are signiﬁcantly negative. Five of the dates have
signiﬁcantly negative CARs over both the three-day and ﬁve-day windows. Four of
the three-day and ﬁve-day CARs’ signiﬁcant reactions were to banking related
announcements, six were to insurance-related events and two were to the December
18, 1989 banking and insurance related date. Over the three-day (ﬁve-day) windows,
REITs in this sample declined, on average, 1.5%(2.3%) to banking announcements
and 0.9%(2.1%) to insurance events. Clearly, contagion exists in the REIT market.
Regression Analysis
The event study results demonstrate that REITs were affected adversely by
announcements that revealed new information about their real estate holdings. To
examine the separate effects of contagion, asset size, and trust type, the following
regression model is estimated:
CAR3 5 a 1 a SIZE 1 a MORTGAGE 1 a HYBRID 1 e . (2) j 01j 2 j 3 jj
CAR3j is the three-day cumulative abnormal return for REIT ‘‘j’’; a0 is the intercept
term capturing the return of equity type REITs; ak (k 5 1, 2, 3) are regression
coefﬁcients; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total market capitalization in billions of
dollars; MORTGAGE is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the trust is a mortgage
REIT, and zero otherwise; HYBRID is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the trust
is a hybrid REIT and zero otherwise; and e is an error term.
The model is estimated for the pooled data on all eight dates and measures the effect
of REIT type and total market capitalization on the three-day CARs. This model
provides direct evidence on the degree to which different REIT types are affected by
the real estate crisis. Speciﬁcally, the abnormal returns are the coefﬁcients of the
dummy variables in a SUR model, with returns on the portfolio as the dependentCONTAGION AND REIT STOCK PRICES 395
Exhibit 2
Daily and CARs of Equally-Weighted Portfolios of Sixty-Nine REITs Around
Eight Real Estate Announcements—1989–91
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Exhibit 2 (continued)
Daily and CARs of Equally-Weighted Portfolios of Sixty-Nine REITs Around
Eight Real Estate Announcements—1989–91










3-Day CARs 52 1.38
(21.9)*
5-Day CARs 52 2.00
(22.0)*
The abnormal returns are the coefﬁcients of the dummy variables in a SUR model, with returns
on the portfolio as the dependent variable. The regressors include returns on the S&P 500 Index
(a proxy for the market), yields on the three-month T-bill and dummy variables for each of the
eight event periods. Each binary dummy variable has value one on the days in the event period,
and zero otherwise. The model is run over 712 consecutive trading days from February 24, 1989
through December 17, 1991. The t-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less, two-tailed test.
Exhibit 3
Heteroskedastically Corrected Estimates for Linear Regressions of CARs of
Sixty-Nine REITs Around Eight Real Estate Announcements
Date Constant SIZE MORTGAGE HYBRID
































































CARs are regressed on total assets and dummy variables for REIT type. t-Statistics are in
parentheses.
CAR3 5 a 1 a SIZE 1 a MORTGAGE 1 a HYBRID 1 e . j 01j 2 j 3 jj
CAR3j is the three-day cumulative abnormal return for REIT ‘‘j ’’; a0 is the intercept term capturing
the return of equity type REITs; ak (k 5 1, 2, 3) are regression coefﬁcients; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total market capitalization in billions of dollars; MORTGAGE is a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if the trust is a mortgage REIT, and zero otherwise; HYBRID is a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if the trust is a hybrid REIT, and zero otherwise; and e is an error term.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less, two-tailed test.CONTAGION AND REIT STOCK PRICES 397
variable. The regressors include returns on the S&P 500 Index (a proxy for the
market), yields on the three-month T-bill and dummy variables for each of the eight
event periods. Each binary dummy variable has a value of one on the days in the
event period, and zero otherwise. The model is run over 712 consecutive trading days
from February 24, 1989 through December 17, 1991. No ex ante predictions as to the
magnitude or signs of the coefﬁcients are made.
Heteroskedastically corrected coefﬁcient estimates (White, 1980) and related t-
Statistics for the regression model are reported in Exhibit 3. Results suggest three-
day CARs are not adversely affected in a signiﬁcant manner by market capitalization
or by REIT type.6 Speciﬁcally, the constant term, SIZE, and HYBRID are
insigniﬁcantly different from zero on all eight event dates, and MORTGAGE is
signiﬁcantly greater (smaller) than equity REITs on only the ﬁrst (second) event date.
In summary, this regression model demonstrates that the market uses announcements
made by banks, thrifts and insurance companies indiscriminately across REIT type
and asset size.
Conclusion
The valuation of real estate assets is difﬁcult because of infrequent trading. As such,
ﬁnancial institutions’ exposure to real estate portfolios remains largely unobservable.
With the rapid decline in the value of real estate holdings in the late 1980s and early
1990s, ﬁnancial institutions with large real estate holdings have been forced to take
charges and make defensive adjustments in their asset structure. These markdowns
afford investors the opportunity to make informed estimates about the value of real
estate holdings and to evaluate exposed ﬁrms’ true worth. Stock price movements are
analyzed both to identify when these revaluations are announced and to examine
whether the price changes reﬂect lenders’ relative exposure to real estate.
The analyses suggest investors use corporate and economic events that reveal
information to estimate the market value of REITs. Around announcements of
declining real estate values, REIT stocks sustain signiﬁcant valuation losses. Total
market capitalization and REIT type do not affect excess returns signiﬁcantly,
however. These ﬁndings support the conclusion that the market efﬁciently assesses
REITs’ and lenders’ investment performance.
Appendix
The following sixty-nine REITs comprise the sample, categorized by type of trust.








Bradley Real Estate Trust
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Burnham Paciﬁc Properties





Grubb and Ellis Realty Income Trust








Meridian Point Realty Trust IV
Meridian Point Realty Trust VI
Meridian Point Realty Trust VII










Santa Anita Realty Properties




United Dominion Realty Trust
Mortgage REITs: (14)
A.S.R. Investments Homeplex Mortgage Investments
Capital Housing and Mortgage Properties Metropolitan Realty Corp.
Capstead Mortgage Corp. Resort Income Investments
Columbia Real Estate Investments Resource Mortgage Capital
C.V. REIT, Inc. Rockefellar Center Properties
C.W.M. Mortgage Holdings Rymac Mortgage Investment
D.V.L., Inc. T.I.S. Mortgage Investment
Hybrid REITs: (13)
Americana Hotels and Realty Corp.
Arizona Land Income Corp.





Monmouth Real Estate Investments
Mortgage and Realty Trust
North American Trust
One Liberty Properties
Presidential Realty Corp #1
Presidential Realty Corp #2
Notes
1 Contagion has received considerable attention in the literature recently, after having been
explored in numerous situations, including corporate bankruptcy, the third-world debt crisis and
unexpected low earnings. These studies investigate the impact of announcements by one ﬁrm
on the market value of common stock of other ﬁrms in the same industry and ﬁnd conclusive
evidence for contagion. The empirical examination of contagion effects has focused on stock
price changes associated with particular announcements and regulatory changes. Lang and Stulz
(1992) study intra-industry contagion of bankruptcy announcements. Cornell and Shapiro
(1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) and Schoder and Vankudre (1988) examine the stock
market response for portfolios of banks to the August 1982 announcement of the Mexican debtCONTAGION AND REIT STOCK PRICES 399
crisis. Cornett and Tehranian (1989) examine stock market reactions to the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). Cornett and Tehranian
(1990) examine the impact of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 on
commercial banks and S&Ls. Allen and Wilhelm (1988) investigate the valuation effect of
DIDMCA on ﬁnancial institutions.
2 The associated problems for lenders were so severe that The Journal of the American Real
Estate and Urban Economics Association dedicated the entire Spring 1994 issue for academic
inquiry into the crisis. Articles in this issue that have direct bearing on this paper include those
by Cole and McKensie (1994), Fergus and Goodman (1994) and Peek and Rosengren (1994).
3 A major banking event not included in the analysis is the failure of the Bank of New England
in 1991. Analysis of stock price movements around the announcement reveals no signiﬁcant
effect, implying that the event contained no new information. This is attributable to innumerable
news stories on banks’ real estate crisis during 1989 and 1990. In contrast, as the November
18, 1991 announcement suggests, Mutual of New York’s real estate losses were largely
unanticipated.
4 This speciﬁcation is similar to the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. As observed
by Fenn and Cole (1994), however, the SUR model reduces to a simple ordinary least squares
estimation when the variables on the right hand side of each equation are the same.
5 While this research does not imply that it explains the entire movement in REIT stock prices,
it does lend evidence that unexpected adverse real estate news signiﬁcantly affects their value.
6 Various diagnostics of the regression model were checked. Market capitalization was included
as a control variable to examine possible size effects. The results remain unchanged. The
correlation matrix also revealed no signiﬁcant correlation between variables.
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